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Introduction
  Looking closely at the tracks followed by the Japanese leaders during 
the Greater East Asian War, they were far from what was expressed 
as their war purpose in the Greater East Asian Declaration （November, 
1943）.  Since it was absolutely impossible to turn the military situation 
for the better, the Japanese leaders of the time should have made the 
second best choice; ʻto gain a victory in terms of philosophy or ideology 
in spite of the defeat on the battlefieldʼ, which is definitely required in 
war as the last resort of diplomacy.  However, Japan could not make its 
war slogan a firm spiritual basis, ʻthe national liberation of Asia from the 
colonial oppression by the Western powersʼ, which had been advocated 
before the war.（1）  
  Diplomatic relations during a war correspond to the tide of the war. 
Most of the Japanese leaders recognized their disability to continue the 
war, because they had already lost the command of the air and the sea, 
and major cities including Tokyo had been severely damaged by heavy 
and almost indiscriminate bombings.  According to TOGO Shigenoriʼs 
memoirs, he claimed that Japanʼs defeat would be a matter of time 
soon after the American troops landed on the mainland, the only option 
available for the Japanese army being ʻguerrilla activityʼ, and ANAMI, 
the Minister of the Army, did not raise an objection to the remarks.（2）
  This study first showed the aim of the war at its outbreak, and 
overlooked the war-time diplomacy after 1943 when the Axis Powers 
were to be defeated, especially what the then Japanese leaders thought 
of ʻthe liberation of Asiaʼ as a national policy in the Greater East Asian 
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Joint Declaration.  Next, we discerned the truth that the greatest 
concern of both the government and the army converged on ʻupholding 
the national polityʼ at the last moment, while the army advocated 
decisive battles in the mainland, and we demonstrated a clear distinction 
between the aim at the outbreak of the war and that at its termination. 
Last, we investigated the principle of Japanese foreign policy by focusing 
on the peace initiative to the Soviet Union as a means of movement to 
the end of the war.
１ .  The aim of the war at its outbreak and ‘the national liberation of 
Asia’ in the Greater East Asian Joint Declaration.
  The design of the termination of the Greater East Asian War had 
been discussed just before the outbreak of the war.  It was aimed at 
expanding Japanese territory by winning a victory.  The first policy in 
ʻthe Basic Outline of Imperial Policy Depending on the Tide of the War（ʼ3） 
determined at the Imperial Council on July 2, 1941, claimed that the 
Empire of Japan should establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity 
Sphere irrespective of the change of the external situation.  The second 
policy showed that the Empire of Japan would deal with the China 
Incident, advance toward the south to build the basis of self-sufficiency 
and self-defense, and resolve Northern Territorial Dispute depending 
on the change of the situation.  In ʻthe Guideline of the Execution of 
Imperial Policyʼ（4） determined at the Imperial Council on November 6, 
1941, it was explicitly confirmed; that the United States and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain should not thwart the design of resolving 
the China Incident （the Sino-Japanese War） by the Empire of Japan 
in accordance with the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and 
China, and with the Japan-Machukoku-China Joint Declaration; that the 
United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain should neither 
close Burma public roads nor support the government led by Chiang 
Kai-shek politically and economically; that the United States and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain should not set up any military rights 
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in the areas of Thailand, Dutch East Indies, China, and the Far East 
in the Soviet Union; that the United States and the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain should not promote war preparations in the Far 
East.  Furthermore, this official document stated that both countries 
should resume the trade with the Empire of Japan and supply enough 
materials to meet the needs of the self-sufficiency of the Empire from 
their territories in the southwest Pacific area.  It also showed that only 
when these demands were met, the Empire of Japan would not perform 
any military advance into the neighboring areas except for China, and 
would withdraw the troops from French Indochina after establishing 
peace, and secure the neutrality of the Philippines.  Thus, the design 
of realizing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere through the 
emancipation of Asia corresponded to the political, economic, and 
territorial expansion of Japan, but not to an extent that the nation could 
avoid occasional conflicts with the Western colonial rulers.  In other 
words, the Japanese leaders of the time stubbornly clung to the old 
tactics of ʻmaintaining the balance among great powersʼ.
  At the outbreak of the war in December, 1941, Japanese military 
supreme commanders cried for joy by having the upper hand in 
the beginning and were completely absorbed in the success.  They 
sought to determine the belongings of the southern areas in terms 
of military policy, and in 1942 they planned to supervise most of the 
local institutions in the Greater East Asian region as well as political, 
economic and cultural affairs there by establishing the Ministry of 
the Greater East Asia.  It was aimed not only to deprive the Foreign 
Ministry of its most important role but also to mobilize all human and 
material resources in the occupied territories to make them contribute 
to the war.  It rested on the idea of keeping the balance between the 
Anglo-American powers and the Empire of Japan.（5）  When the issue, 
ʻthe belongings and authority of the occupied territoriesʼ, was placed 
on the agenda on March 14, 1942, the Prime Minister, TOJO, asked the 
Navy what areas to occupy completely to secure necessary military 
bases.  ITO, the Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff Office, answered 
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that there would be nothing to be desired if they could occupy all the 
southern areas.  Malay and Sumatra, blessed with natural resources, 
were determined to belong to the Empire, although the Philippines and 
Burma were given recognition to independence.  Moreover, Singapore 
was not given independence even in name only, because of the 
geopolitical importance the area had in terms of military policy.  These 
were good examples. （6）
  However, most of the Japanese military supreme commanders, 
blinded by the success in the beginning, forgot their grand political 
design.  They could not obtain support from the people in the occupied 
areas while the tide of the war was better for them, and they suffered 
crushing defeats in the Battles of Midway and Gadalcanal.
  The Greater East Asian Council was held in Tokyo in November, 1943, 
when the U.S. Navy was anticipated to launch earnest counterattacks 
in the Pacific.  Japanʼs main objective at the council was to mobilize all 
human and natural resources in the occupied territories to fulfill the 
war.  It was SHIGEMITSU Mamoru that in the conference sought to 
demonstrate the universality of Japanʼs war purpose not just to Asian 
nations, but to the Allied Powers in the joint declaration of the council 
（the Greater East Asian Joint Declaration）, and also attempted to 
perform a new diplomatic initiative in terms of the postwar conception. 
Shigemitsu became the Foreign Minister in the Tojo Cabinet in April, 
1943, and tried to give some substantiality to the Japanese declaration 
on the emancipation of Asia and to show Japanʼs postwar conception 
to take a stand to the Atlantic Charter by the Allied Powers.  The 
preamble of the declaration showed that ʻthe nations in the Greater East 
Asia should cooperate to fulfill the Greater East Asian War, to liberate 
the Greater East Asian peoples from the fetters of the West, and to 
establish the self-sufficiency and self-defenseʼ.  However, it is clear 
that the aim was to wage the war by getting resources when looking 
at the process of the planning of the declaration within the Japanese 
government and the correspondence by its leaders at the council.（7） 
To cite an example, Indonesia, one of the most important areas to 
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get resources, was not invited, and neither was it given any word of 
independence at the council.  In this way, although the purpose of the 
war was explicitly announced as the universal idea at the conference, ʻthe 
national liberation of Asiaʼ advocated in the Joint Declaration was just 
ʻa diplomatic offensiveʼ, in which ʻthe roundabout foundation work for 
peaceʼ was included as a hidden intention.（8）  
  In conclusion, the idea of liberation for the Japanese leaders, especially 
for those of the military authorities, was merely the tactics to wage the 
war by obtaining the territories and resources.  On the other hand, that 
idea for officials of the Foreign Ministry like Shigemitsu was to present 
Japanʼs strong case for taking a postwar stand against the U.S. and the 
U.K., while they reconciled themselves to accepting the continuance of 
the existing colonial system in the midst of the war situation getting 
worse for them.  To put it differently, their conception for the postwar 
world at the outbreak of the war, which had been pictured in the light 
of winning a victory, changed mentally into another conception to 
prepare for the defeat.  This means that the idea of liberation was not 
the supreme end of the war but just a means to keep the balance among 
the leading nations.  As a result, the Greater East Asian Declaration 
only revealed Japanese growing impatience with the tide of the war 
to Asian nations as well as the U.S., which had been getting concerned 
about the returning of European colonial rulers to Asia.（9） 
２ .  The balance of power and the conservation of the ruling class as 
the postwar conception
  The U.S.－U.K.―China trilateral summit was held in Cairo in 
November, 1943.  The Allied Powers expressed there for the first 
time the fundamental design about dealing with Japan after the war. 
They also confirmed the removal of all the islands and territories in 
the Pacific Japan had gained after the First World War, the returning 
of Manchukoku, Taiwan, and Shoko Island to China, and the freedom 
and independence of the Korean Peninsula.  In the meantime, however, 
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postwar Asian nations were on the point of changing dramatically at 
this time.  First, the defeat of the Japanese Army was going to bring 
about national revolution in Asia.  Second, the Yanʼan Government had 
been gradually awakening the peoples in the colonies in Asia.（10）  Not 
merely the U.S. and the U.K. whose priority was to defeat the Axis 
Powers, but also Japan, which was seeking its postwar foreign policy on 
the assumption of bringing peace based on the defeat, could not respond 
to this Asian stream.  Both parties were much the same in this point of 
view.
  The Prime Minister, Tojo, disputed in his speech on the radio that 
ʻwe, 100 million brotherhood, would advance closely together with one 
billion people in the Greater East Asia to fulfill the warʼ, and that ʻthe 
enemy was seeking to disturb the Greater East Asia from the inside at 
the cost of Japan, while gaining complete control over the Chongqing 
Government, and dangling an enticing carrot of replacing Japan with 
Chiang Kai-shek.（11）
  Here we found that the Japanese leaders of the time had had the 
postwar conception based on the balance of power with the West, 
though they had advocated the emancipation of Asia as their war 
purpose.  It can be pointed out here that the statement of ʻreplacing 
Japan with Chiang Kai-shekʼ was produced from the intention to secure 
the distribution of the rights and interests in Asia to the benefit of 
Japan.  It did not go a single step out of the postwar conception at 
the outbreak of the war.  In fact, Japan could not develop any positive 
foreign policy to Asian countries or the Allied Powers in terms of the 
substantial emancipation.  
  The Japanese Foreign Minister, Togo, who made a speech at the House 
of Peers on January 21, 1942, claimed that ʻJapan had a noble mission 
of bringing liberation and prosperity to East Asia in the light of world 
history, and had been fighting for the just cause.ʼ（12）  In 1943, however, 
he advised senior statesmen that ʻhe had concluded their defeat would 
be unavoidable if this disadvantageous tide of the war went on,ʼ adding 
that ʻthe defeat of the war would be inevitable without carrying out 
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resolutely a huge revolution.ʼ（13）  ʻA huge revolutionʼ in Togoʼs speech 
meant regaining the political and diplomatic leadership from the Army, 
and taking the domestic initiative toward the termination of the war.（14） 
In fact, however, his aim was to prevent the ruin of the conservatives 
by communist revolution and to protect the Emperor system of Japan 
as their symbol.  This idea can be found in his speech that political, or 
rather communist revolution would occur if they took a wrong course in 
the process toward the termination of the war, and that they had to do 
whatever it might take to protect the Emperor system.（15）
  In conclusion, the idea of ʻthe liberation of Asia from the colonial 
systemʼ inevitably disappeared from the postwar conception when the 
state of the war had become desperate, because the war purpose for 
the Japanese leaders rested on the intention of maintaining the balance 
among the great powers externally, and of conserving the ruling class 
domestically. 
３.  The liberation of Asia in the policy toward the Soviet Union
  In 1944, Japan was defeated in the Solomons and the Marianas, 
followed by the loss of Saipan in July.  The war situation was totally 
desperate for Japan.  Diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet 
Union were quite delicate and important affairs for the Japanese foreign 
policy until the end of the war.  The Soviet Union was at war with 
Germany, while maintaining neutrality with Japan.  This gave birth to 
the national policy which both the Foreign Ministry and the Army could 
cooperate to deal with, because the communist power was considered 
Japanʼs last trump card to make peace with the Allied Powers.  Here, 
we aimed to demonstrate how the Japanese leaders of the time had 
dealt with the relations with the Soviet Union in their war purpose. 
  When the Russo-German War broke out, some leaders in the Japanese 
Army advocated opening hostilities against the Soviet Union.  However, 
KONOE, the Prime Minister, and the Navy, who had been anxious about 
the war situation in the Pacific, were against the new battle.  The third 
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guideline in ʻthe Basic Outline of Imperial Policy Depending on the Tide 
of the Warʼ（16） confirmed that ʻthe war between Germany and the Soviet 
Union should not be intervened for a while.  When the tide of the war 
took a turn for the better for the Empire of Japan, weapons should be 
used to resolve the Northern China Dispute.ʼ（17）  The fourth guideline 
stated that ʻwhether to open hostilities against the Soviet Union should 
not change the Empireʼs fundamental policy on the war in the Pacific.ʼ 
To put it differently, the policy toward the Soviets was considered less 
important than that of advancing toward the south to prepare for the 
war against America and Britain, and ʻthe liberation of Asiaʼ was not 
directly referred to as the war purpose.   
  By the year of 1943, however, the Russo-Japanese balance began 
to change as the Pacific and the Russo-German Fronts began to 
progress.  Togo planned to maintain neutrality with the Soviet Union. 
He advocated not only bringing peace to the Russo-Germany War by 
putting political pressure on Germany if necessary, but also achieving 
a Japanese-Soviet alliance, which had been seen as the last card for 
Japan.  This conception of the peace of the Russo-German War through 
the intermediation of Japan was based on Togoʼs belief that the peace 
between the two powers would exert an immeasurable influence on 
the war in the Pacific.（18）  However, the Army and some officials in the 
Foreign Ministry insisted on straddling on the fence, being afraid that 
Japanʼs alliance with the Soviet Union would give rise to Germanyʼs 
peace with America and Britain, and as a result, Japan would be left 
alone on the battlefield against them after the Japanese-German relations 
turned for the worse.（19）
  Even in such a situation, most of the Japanese leaders sought to 
gain the inside track in the postwar order in which America, Britain, 
Germany and the Soviet Union would be the leading players.  This 
reveals that they did not consider the policy toward the Soviets in 
terms of the emancipation of Asia.  In other words, Togo was strongly 
concerned about the defeat of Germany in the Russo-German Front 
triggering that of the Axis Powers, while the Army hoped that 
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Germany would win a victory with the collapse of the Soviets, which 
would unavoidably lead to the increase in their rights and interests 
in the Far East.  As the complete victory over America and Britain 
had been becoming desperate, the last resort for the Japanese leaders 
was to propose a truce and bring peace to their greatest advantage on 
the assumption that they would confront the Anglo-American powers 
after the war.  Both the Russo-German War and the policy toward the 
communist power were recognized as the key tools for surviving as one 
of the leading players in the postwar world.
  Shigemitsu, who assumed office as the Foreign Minister in April, 
1943, promoted the policy toward the Soviets more positively than 
Togo.  On September 30, 1943, Shigemitsu claimed at the conference 
in the presence of the Emperor that Sovietʼs entry on the Allied side 
in the current situation would be a crushing blow for Japan, and that 
they should avoid stimulating the Soviet dictator so that they would 
not provide a pretext for his reneging on the Neutrality Pact.（20）  The 
Minister went on to advocate as concrete measures that it would not 
be impossible to end the Russo-German War if Japan could help the 
Soviet Union to advance toward the Mediterranean Sea and Asia Minor, 
because the communist state was planning to make Europe turn red and 
to Stalin the Anglo-American powers were ʻbitter enemies in the same 
boatʼ.（21）  The diplomatic approach to the Soviets by Shigemitsu was 
virtually the same as the previous one in terms of pursuing the balance 
of power.  Here it can be pointed out that his conception also rested on 
ʻthe benefit-sharingʼ among great nations by seeing the postwar order 
as an arena of power politics, lacking the view of making substantial 
emancipation of Asia.
  In the latter half of 1944, Shigemitsu attempted to take back the helm 
of diplomacy which the Army had grasped, and to promote external 
policy toward the end of the war by ʻsheer force of diplomacyʼ.（22） 
The Foreign Minister was firmly convinced that the domestic ruling 
by the Army and the defeat in the war were inseparably linked.  He 
believed that the diplomatic offensive superior to that of the Allied 
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Powers would resolve these two factors at the same time.  To the 
Minister, the Greater East Asian Declaration and the planning for the 
alliance with the communist power meant a possibility of making up 
for the defeat on the battlefield as well as providing a strategy for 
ʻwinning a diplomatic victoryʼ to carry out the drastic reforms of the 
domestic structure.  Specifically, he advocated as follows: ʻThe aim of 
the war for the Empire of Japan is fair and it should be made clearer 
externallyʼ; ʻDefinitely necessary for the Empire now is to promote 
the understanding of the Soviets about our every endeavor as an East 
Asian nation to bring about the construction and stability of East Asiaʼ; 
ʻOur policy to aim at the liberation and independence of the East Asian 
peoples is consistent with that of the Soviet Union.ʼ  He was seeking to 
form cooperative relations with Stalin through the use of the phrases, ʻthe 
aim of the warʼ, ʻEast Asian nationsʼ, or ʻliberation and independenceʼ, 
and through the pro-communist policy in China. （23）
  This idea of developing some alliance between Japan and the Soviet 
Union and among Japan, the Soviets, and China was based on his belief 
in the postwar world ruled by power politics.  In fact, supposing that 
it would be possible for Japan and the Soviets to join hands when 
the protection of the rights and interests for the latter in East Asia 
was achieved not by America and Britain but by the Japan-Soviet 
compromise, and that the antagonism between the Anglo-American 
powers and the communist state would be inevitable in accordance with 
the progress of the war situation, Shigemitsu sought diplomacy by sheer 
force of power politics, and stated that their Empire should ask Stalin 
whether he could make a compromise with Germany when Moscow 
could obtain security in the western area to advance toward the 
Mediterranean Sea.（24）  Put another way, his idea aimed at building the 
postwar order in the confrontation between the two camps, the camp of 
the Anglo-American powers and that of Japan, the Soviets, and China. 
It did not rise above the previous conception of the balance of power. 
  The Soviet Government, however, refused several offers from Japan 
to send an envoy to make the Russo-German peace and to reinforce the 
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Japan-Soviet cooperation, resulting in the negotiation between the two 
governments hitting a snag. Thus, Japan only revealed itself to be a 
disgraceful loser to the Soviet Union, which was going to be a winner in 
the war against Germany, and was gaining a victory over Japan through 
the Yanʼan Government.
  Reading telegrams from the Foreign Minister, SATO Naotake, 
ambassador to the Soviet Union, concluded that it was extremely 
shameful as a great nation to try to make a disgraceful concession to 
survive after involving the Southeast Asians in the ravages of war, and 
that he could not possibly stand the disappointment and contempt from 
Thailand or Burma. （25）
  Thus, as ʻthe national liberation of Asiaʼ was not the supreme ideal but 
a means of diplomacy, the last card left with the loser was ʻstruggling 
for survivalʼ after getting Asian peoples in the disasters, namely, ʻthe 
renunciation of responsibility for the liberationʼ.
４.  From the liberation of Asia to upholding the national polity
　
  As the tide of the war was getting worse than ever before for Japan 
after the crushing defeat in the battle of the Philippines, by October 
of the year 1944, the Imperial Japanese Army had secretly begun to 
investigate how they should take on the Allied landing troops based 
on ʻthe Program on the Mainland Decisive Battleʼ.（26）  The most 
noteworthy point here is that the Japanese Army thought an out-and-
out resistance to the bitter end in Asia would lead to preventing the 
Soviets from entering the war against Japan.  Heading off the Soviet 
entry was considered an absolute requirement to prevent the Army 
from being broken up associated with the defeat in the war, and a do-
or-die resistance to the Allied Forces a prerequisite for the avoidance 
of the Soviet entry.  In early April, 1945, the General Staff Office of the 
Imperial Japanese Army analyzed the state of affairs in ʻthe Comment by 
the Vice Chief on the War Guidelines for Chiefs of Staff of the Imperial 
Army （draft）ʼ, presenting the view that definitely fundamental was to 
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avoid commencing hostilities against the Soviet Union.（27）  According to 
the comment, the Soviet entry would have an immeasurable influence 
on the termination of the Greater East Asian War, and if the U.S. should 
begin to take control of the continent of China, the Soviet Union would 
advance toward the south to use weapons.（28）  This view reveals that 
the Japanese Army considered the decisive battle in the mainland not 
as the national policy to liberate Asia but as a clever piece of tactics to 
survive in the postwar order ruled by the two camps, while foreseeing 
factors on the Cold War after the Axis Powers lost the war.
  As they lost the battles and aerial attacks were becoming increasingly 
serious, the diplomacy toward the end of the war was more actively 
promoted.　As shown before, the Greater East Asian Council was held 
in 1943, the purpose of which was to confront the Atlantic Charter with 
the war purpose of Japan and to incorporate Asian nations into the war 
footing.  And the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu, sought the 
strategies of bringing peace to the Russo-German War and some alliance 
between Japan and the Soviets to prevent the Axis Powers from being 
shattered.  Tokyo kept on attempting to form a political alliance with 
the communist power, because both the Foreign Ministry and the Army 
agreed that absolutely necessary was the prevention of the Soviet entry 
into the war to avoid the total collapse of Japan. 
  Unfortunately, this Japanese judgement was over-optimistic and lacked 
foresight.  Stalin condemned Japan as ʻan evil aggressorʼ in his speech 
made at the 27th Anniversary of the Soviet Revolution in November, 
1944, before giving notice not to extend the period of the Soviet-
Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 5, 1945.（29）  Even after that, however, 
Tokyo still continued to seek ʻa phantom loveʼ from the country which 
had secretly determined to enter the war.  At the Supreme War 
Leadership Conference held on April 30, 1945, the Government and the 
Army, expressing the words of praise to the strenuous efforts of the 
German Government and people, confirmed that they should take care 
not to stimulate the national sentiment of the Soviet Union.  They still 
hoped to make peace overtures to the U.S. through the intermediation of 
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the communist power. （30）  
  In the midst of these attempts, Konoe made a direct appeal to the 
Emperor, saying “Regrettably, our defeat in the war could not be 
possibly avoided.  Communism that is sure to emerge and spread 
associated with the defeat is now the most truly-alarming factor of all 
from the viewpoint of upholding the national polity.  It is a party in the 
Army indoctrinated with an idea of communism that stands in the way 
to the termination of the war.  To carry out the reforms of the Army 
is the indispensable prerequisite to save Japan from communism.”（31） 
This appeal to the throne is not simply worthy of attention as an appeal 
to the Emperor associated with the moves to end the war, but also of 
great interest in that Konoe and the ruling class feared that communist 
revolution in the Army which would occur by continuing the war could 
give rise to the ruin of the Emperor system.  However, what is more 
important and noteworthy is that Konoeʼs purpose did not go a single 
step out of upholding the national polity.  At the Paris Peace Conference 
after the First World War, Konoe presented a thesis the theme of which 
was ʻOvercoming Self-Centered Pacifism by the Anglo-American Powersʼ. 
And he stated that what they had pursued since the Manchurian 
Incident was inevitable for Japan, and that the aim of the Greater East 
Asian War was the emancipation of Asian peoples oppressed by western 
colonial powers.  But in his advice to the Emperor, he condemned a 
party in the Army for the war, attempting to uphold the national polity 
by ending the war and stirring up the fear of communism.（32）  The 
Konoes being the head family of regents and advisors, it can be easily 
imagined that he wished to conserve the Imperial Household and its 
supporting class after the war by protecting the Emperor from the 
war crime affairs which could be raised after the war.  However, it 
was the fear of communism that made him hesitate at an alliance with 
the Soviet Union and made him plan to bring peace through the direct 
negotiation with America.（33）  Anticipating the postwar antagonism 
between the two camps, Konoe sought as the fundamental foreign policy 
to develop cooperative relations with the capitalistic party in terms of 
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power politics.（34）  Here, we found that no sense of responsibility for 
the liberation of Asia could be seen in this conception of his at the last 
minute.
  When the KOISO Cabinet was replaced with that led by SUZUKI 
Kantaro in April, 1945, Togo appeared as the Foreign Minister again. 
He still wished to make peace through the Soviet intermediation until 
the end of the war.  But the talks between HIROTA and Malik did 
not make any substantial progress.  In July, Konoe was appointed to 
the special envoy to the Soviet Union at the Supreme War Leadership 
Conference.  However, Stalin rejected the sending from Japan on the 
grounds that the mission of the envoy was not clear.  Japan made an 
offer to send the envoy again, but the Soviets did not respond to it.  In 
the middle of these desperate attempts the Potsdam Declaration was 
issued by the Allied Powers on July 26.  Faced with the ultimatum 
before the complete destruction, Togo still insisted on promoting 
the peace negotiation with America and Britain through the Soviet 
intermediation after investigating the relations between the declaration 
and the Soviets.（35）  It was, as it were, ʻa phantom diplomacyʼ.
  After that, the Japanese leaders traced the tracks to accepting the 
Potsdam Declaration by converging on ʻupholding the national polityʼ 
and ʻthe decisive battle in the mainlandʼ.  Since ʻthe liberation of Asiaʼ 
was not the absolute purpose of the war, they sought to develop 
external policy toward the end of the war in terms of the balance of 
power among the leading countries, aiming to protect the dominant 
class including themselves.  No unawareness of responsibility for the 
liberation can be found here. 
Conclusion
　
  The war in the Pacific and Asia became the great momentum for the 
independence of Asian nations.  Southeast Asians do not have large 
foreign forces stationed in the beginning of the 21st century.  They are 
blessed with more freedom and independence than ever before.  In this 
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point of view, the Greater East Asian War led to the national liberation 
of the oppressed.  However, until the end of the war the Japanese 
leaders clung to the conception of upholding the national polity, which 
corresponded to conserving the traditional ruling system internally, and 
clung to power politics among the leading countries externally.  What 
they sought was not ʻthe liberation of Asia.
  The meaning of the war and the responsibility for it should be 
conveyed to the next generation all the more clearly for the calamitous 
defeat.  However, Japan did not even make any endeavor to carve its 
case and proof in history.  Japanese diplomacy was a complete loser 
in this respect.  According to Shigemitsu, ʻthe supreme aim of the war 
and its limitation should be fundamental to recover peace.  To find out 
the optimal substance for a human being as well as a nation brings 
great power and holy work.  Whatever the result of the war may be, 
the future for the nation and the human being can be found in this 
effort.ʼ（36）  Here we can find a great difference between this comment of 
Shigemitsuʼs and who the Japanese leaders, including him, really were 
at the last moment of the war.
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